

MAY 22 1956

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

Ag 3-1
X- Ag 1

Exeter Hears Talk About CIA By Allen Dulles

EXETER — Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, spoke Sunday night at the Lamont Gallery on "The Challenge of Public Service." He was introduced by Principal William G. Saltonstall of Exeter academy.

Mr. Dulles said that in the main the Agency is a fact-gathering group which condenses the gathered information to be turned over to the policy-making branches of the government. Under this general gathering of information, he said, there are at least 20 vital problems now being carefully watched by the Agency. He cited among others the Near East, Formosa, Indonesia, German unification, any of which might cause a breakout of war on short notice. He said the most absorbing problem of all was the constant threat that Russia poses.

For Quick Action

The next, and a corollary problem, was presenting intelligence material to the policy-makers in such a way that they could take quick action; particularly when it came to what he termed "dramatic information" i. e., information that would show an urgent need to

be on guard against attack.

In this respect he referred to Pearl Harbor, and the fact that America had broken the Japanese code before the attack and "knew it was coming." At that time there was no CIA that could quickly transport the information to government heads, who might have counteracted the blow. He felt the present set-up with its watch committee, which he personally refers to as an anti-Pearl Harbor committee, is better than anything we had prior to 1947.

He referred to the Chinese entry into the Korean war in 1950. At the time, he said, the exact strength of the Chinese above the Yalu River was known, but the one thing that wasn't known then was whether China would enter the war. It was only later that pieces fell into place that could have given a sure picture so that the agency could have given an even stronger report to the policy group.

Tendency to Disbelieve

He said there was a great tendency in all countries, not just the United States, to disbelieve intelligence particularly if it was of a dramatic nature. He referred in this respect to Hitler's "Mein Kampf," stating that we only had to read it carefully and believe it to know exactly what was going to happen.

In recalling the constant watch kept on Russian doings, he said the de-Stalinization program had to have its roots somewhere and those roots were most likely a dissatisfaction within the country. He said Russia put itself in a position of having to tear up its history books, its encyclopedias, its school books; in other words to throw 20 years out of the window and this was no easy thing to do.

In a question and answer period later, he was asked what if any significance the recent Russian statements of disarmament had. He felt there was no doubt that Russia meant it to some degree. He said it would be impossible for them to advertise the fact they were cutting down the size of the army considerably and advertise the fact among their own people, without taking some action. The Russians might and could easily hedge on the matter by several hundred thousands, but at least they were committed to do something. In fact, intelligence reaching his office indicated the Russians were advertising for all sorts of help in Siberia, where there are huge undeveloped areas.

Another item of intelligence was the rapid growth of scientific studies within the Soviet Union. Today they are graduating more scientists and engineers from their schools than is the United States, he said.